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TELLING STORIES IN SCHOOL: USING CASE
STUDIES AND STORIES TO TEACH LEGAL
ETHICS
Carrie Menkel-MeadowV
"We tell ourselves stories in order to live."
-Joan Didion, The White Album (1979)
"Their story, yours, mine-it's what we carry with
us on this trip we take, and we owe it to each other
to respect our stories and learn from them."
-William Carlos Williams in Robert Coles,
The Call of Stories: Teaching and the Moral
Imagination 30 (1989)
I.
Many years ago I suggested that law teachers, and especially clinical
law teachers, could and should make better use of "real" cases ("real"
as in on-going and in progress, instead of dried up and finished
appellate cases reported in textbooks) to teach about lawyering,
decision-making, the social impact of law and legal ethics.' Since I
first made that suggestion twenty years ago, law teachers and lawyers
have discovered the power of case stories and narratives to
accomplish many things.
1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Chair, Georgetown-
CPR Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR. Thanks to Meredith Weinberg
for valuable research assistance.
2. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory Criticisms of Clinical Legal
Education: Dilemmas and Directions in Lawyering Education, 4 Antioch L. J. 287,297
(1986) (suggesting the use of "case rounds" in law teaching as used in medical
education).
3. For some descriptions of the law and literature movement generally, see
Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Literary Criticisms of Law (1999); Robert A.
Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (1984); Law and Literature: Text and
Theory (Lenora Ledwon ed. 1996); Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature (rev. ed.
1998); Brook Thomas, Cross-Examinations of Law and Literature: Cooper,
Hawthorne, Stowe, and Melville (1987); Richard H. Weisberg, The Failure of the
Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modem Fiction (1984); Robin West, Narrative,
Authority, and Law (1993); James Boyd White, Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in
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Legal narratives put flesh on the bones of the eviscerated appellate
case reports; they allow us entry into the subjective experiences of the
actors (including lawyers, clients, parties, judges, clerks, victims, law
enforcers and those affected by the law) and they demonstrate the
''aftereffects" or consequences of legal decision-making and action.
Because stories about the law (both fictional and real) allow us to visit
the psychological and moral realms of legal actors both before and
after they make decisions or take actions, stories and case studies have
become an increasingly common way to teach about legal ethics.
Though the notion of stories, literature and narratives as tools for
teaching readers about morality and ethics began long ago, outside the
realm of law,4 legal ethicists, clinical teachers, legal scholars and
lawyers have recently taken up their pens (should I say computer
Literature, Law, and Politics (1994); James Boyd White, From Expectation to
Experience: Essays on Law and Legal Education (1999); Elizabeth Villiers
Gemmette, Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in the Liberal Arts
Component of the Law School Curriculum, 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 267 (1989); and
Elizabeth Villiers Gemmeyte, Law and Literature, Joining the Class Action, 29 Val. U.
L. Rev. 665 (1995).
Critical race theorists, feminists theorists and other "outsiders" to the canon of
mainstream doctrine and jurisprudence have used their stories and narratives to
illustrate the harms and injustices that law inflicts by excluding some of us from its
tales and remedies. See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev.
2073 (1989); see Robin West, Law, Literature and Feminism, in Feminist
Jurisprudence, Women and the Law: Critical Essays, Research Agenda and
Bibliography (Betty W. Taylor et al. eds., 1999); Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of
Race and Rights (1991); Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and Stories of Law, 13 Nova
L. Rev. 355 (1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic
Learning: Post-Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA Women's L.J. 287 (1992)
(book review).
For some samples of fiction written or edited by lawyers that draw on legal
narratives both to entertain and to teach, see, e.g., Legal Fictions: Short Stories About
Lawyers and the Law (Jay Wishingrad ed. 1992); Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Tender: A
Lawyer's Guide to Handling Professional Dilemmas (1995); Lawrence Joseph,
Lawyerland: What Lawyers Talk About When They Talk About Law (1997). Of
course, in my view the "master" of this genre still remains Louis Auchincloss, see, e.g.,
Powers of Attorney (1963), Diary of a Yuppie (1986), Atonement and Other Stories
(1997), with Arthur R. G. Solmssen, a lesser known, but equally interesting,
chronicler of the twentieth century law firm, see, e.g., The Comfort Letter: A Novel
(1975). The massive outpouring of legal fiction and thrillers which I will not discuss
here (e.g., Scott Turow, John Grisham, Nancy Rosenberg, Lisa Scottoline and Linda
Fairstein novels) demonstrate both lawyers' needs to write about the dilemmas of
their work and the continuing demand from lawyers and laypeople alike to read about
them.
4. Most literary critics attribute the first use of narrative for moral or political
purposes to Plato. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on
Philosophy and Literature (1990); Richard Posner, The Edifying School of Legal
Scholarship in Posner, supra note 3; see also Wayne C. Booth, The Company We
Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (1988); Robert Coles, The Call of Stories: Teaching and
the Moral Imagination (1989) [hereinafter Coles, The Call of Stories]; John Gardner,
On Moral Fiction (1978); Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary
Imagination and Public Life (1995) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Poetic Justice]; Leo
Tolstoy, What is Art? (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., 1995); Ian
Watt, The Art of the Novel (1957).
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fingers?) to compose, invent, create, report, recite, raconte and
narrate morality tales. These range from the very real reporting of
actual cases, fictionalized versions of real cases, simulated role plays,
and made-up stories to the use of the texts of both high and low
culture5 in order to explore the ethical dilemmas facing the modem
lawyer.6 This Symposium provides some illustrations of these diverse
5. For some of the "classics" considered to be examples of "high culture" used
for teaching about legal ethics or the morality of professionalism, see, e.g., Aeschylus,
The Eumenides, in Aeschylus, The Oresteia (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books
1979); Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons: A Play in Two Acts (1961); Charles
Dickens, Bleak House (1852); George Eliot, Middlemarch (Davis Carrol ed., Oxford
U. Press 1997); Susan Glaspell: Essays on Her Theater and Fiction (Linda Ben-Zvi
ed., 1995); Susan Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers (1917) (play based on short story);
Franz Kafka, The Trial (1925); Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird (1960); Herman
Melville, Bartleby the Scrivener (1853); Herman Melville, Billy Budd (1891); George
Orwell, 1984 (1949); William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice; Sophocles,
Antigone; that "classic" of modem popular culture, Robert Traver, Anatomy of a
Murder (1958); and Anthony Trollope, Barchester Towers (1857). For a relatively
obscure but interesting fictionalized "diary" of a nineteenth century American
Lawyer, see Arthur Train, Yankee Lawyer: The Autobiography of Ephraim Tutt
(Common Redaer e. 1999) (1943). More recent novelistic treatments of lawyers and
legal ethics include Russell Banks, The Sweet Hereafter (1991); Alan Dershowitz,
The Advocate's Devil (1994); William Gaddis, A Frolic of His Own (1994); and the
entire corpus of John Grisham and Scott Turow. For an interesting collection of short
stories exploring what "justice" and the use of lawyers means to those upon whom
law is practiced, see Outside the Law: Narratives on Justice (Susan Richards Shreve &
Porter Shreve eds., 1997).
For some interesting "comparative professional ethics" through literary treatments
one can productively read George Eliot, Felix Holt: The Radical (1866) (politicians);
Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter (Nina Baym ed. Penguin Books 14 ed. 1986)
(clergy); William Dean Howells, A Modem Instance (1882) (journalism); Kazuo
Ishiguro, The Remains of the Day (1989) (butlers); Plato, Gorgias (Walter Hamilton
trans., Penguin 1971) (rhetoreticians).
For treatments of legal ethics in more modem forms, films and TV, see e.g. Paul
Bergman and Michael Asimow, Reel Justice: The Courtroom Goes to the Movies
(1996); Prime Time Law: Fictional Television as Legal Narrative (Robert M. Jarvis &
Paul R. Joseph eds., 1998). These I will not discuss here. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Legal Ethics in Popular Culture, UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2001).
This partial listing demonstrates how rich is our literary heritage in legal ethics
stories in literary treatments (and these are just a few of those in English or easily
available translation-I haven't even mentioned the Russian or French novels that
could be listed here as well). As those who teach legal ethics reach further and wider
for lessons about legal ethics and analogies to legal ethics from other professions, the
canon of literary legal ethics stories is ever growing, as demonstrated by Robert
Cochran's reading in this issue of Joseph Conrad's Nostromo, Robert Cochran, Honor
as a Deficient Aspiration for "The Honorable Profession ". The Lawyer as Nostromo,
Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 859.
6. This is my "genre" footnote, suggesting a few of the varieties of ways that both
lawyers and non-lawyers have chosen to illustrate, through narratives, case studies,
cases and stories, the work of the lawyer and the ethical issues raised by the practice
of our craft. For some general lawyer accounts of the use of stories, both real and
fictionalized, to illustrate legal practice ethical dilemmas, see, for example, Milner S.
Ball, The Word and the Law (1993); Law Stories (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow, eds.
1996); Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz, ed. 1996); Charles A. Reich, The Sorcerer of Bolinas Reef (1976); Thomas
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L. Shaffer, American Legal Ethics: Text, Readings, and Discussion Topics (1985);
Gerald M. Stem, The Buffalo Creek Disaster: The Story of the Survivors'
Unprecedented Lawsuit (1976); Richard H. Weisberg, Poethics and Other Strategies
of Law and Literature (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of
Lawyers: Lawyering in Literature, Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical
Choices Regarding Career and Craft, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 1 (1999) [hereinafter
Menkel-Meadow, Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers].
For some examples of the new "bill and tell" genre (only slightly fictionalized
versions or true journalistic accounts of life in the large modem law firm), see, e.g.,
Paul M. Barrett, The Good Black: A True Story of Race in America (1999); Lincoln
Caplan, Skadden: Power, Money and the Rise of a Legal Empire (1993); William R.
Keates, Proceed with Caution: A Diary of the First Year at One of America's Largest,
Most Prestigious Law Firms (1997); Cameron Stracher, Double Billing (1998). For
similar "diaries" of criminal lawyers, both prosecutors and defense lawyers, see David
Heilbroner, Rough Justice: Days and Nights of a Young DA (1990); James S. Kunen,
How Can You Defend Those Guilty People?: The Making of a Criminal Lawyer
(1983); Stephen Phillips, No Heroes, No Villains: The Story of a Murder Trial (1977).
For a harrowing memoir of a judge turned prisoner, see Sol Wachtler, After the
Madness: A Judge's Own Prison Memoir (1997), perhaps the best argument for the
effects of experiential learning.
The "ethical legal memoir" might be thought to date (in modem times) from those
telling tales of legal socialization-the now canonical stories of competitive behavior
in the first year of law school. See, e.g., Chris Goodrich, Anarchy and Elegance:
Confessions of a Journalist at Yale Law School (1991); Richard D. Kahlenberg,
Broken Contract: A Memoir of Harvard Law School (1992); John J. Osborne, Paper
Chase (1971) (more fictionalized version); Scott Turow, One L (1977) (Doesn't
anyone have any memories of any law school besides Harvard or Yale? Where are
those would-be entertainment writers at NYU or UCLA?).
Lawyers' own narratives of their dilemmas in legal ethics and decision-making
could productively be compared to more journalistic reporting of these issues situated
in more contextualized and sociologically rich settings. See, e.g., Melissa Fay Greene,
Praying for Sheetrock: A Work of Nonfiction (1991); Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action
(1995); Janet Malcolm, The Crime of Sheila McGough (1999); David Margolick,
Undue Influence; The Epic Battle for the Johnson and Johnson Fortune (1993).
Similarly, lawyer and journalistic accounts of the "single" illustrative or exceptional
case could be compared to the perhaps duller but more accurate attempts of legal
sociologists (some of whom are also lawyers) to study legal ethics empirically. See
Jerome Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar (1966); Jerome
Carlin, Lawyers On Their Own: A Study of Individual Practicioners in Chicago
(1962); Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The
Transformation of the Big Law Firm (1991); Joel E. Handler, The Lawyer and His
Community: The Practicing Bar in a Middle-Sized Community (1967); Douglas E.
Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's In Charge (1974); Carroll Seron, The Business
of Practicing Law: The Work Lives of Solo and Small Firm Attorneys (1996); Susan
Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties (forthcoming).
Potentially most useful for an examination of how actual lawyers cope with and
make ethical decisions are the numerous biographies and autobiographies of famous
and infamous lawyers and judges. See, e.g., Clarence Darrow, The Story of My Life
(Allan A. Dershowitz, Introduction, 1996); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man
and the Judge (1994); William H. Harbaugh, Lawyers' Lawyer: The Life of John W.
Davis (1990); John C. Jeffries, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (1994); Laura Kalman, Abe
Fortas: A Biography (1990); Andrew L. Kaufman, Cardozo (1998); Arthur Kinoy,
Rights on Trial: Odyssey of a People's Lawyer (1994); William M. Kunstler, My Life
as a Radical Lawyer (1996); Arthur L. Liman, Lawyer: A Life of Counsel and
Controversy (1999); John Thomas Noonan, Persons and Masks of the Law (1976);
Phillipa Strum, Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism (1993); Mark V. Tushnet, Making
Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall 1936-1961 (1998); Mark V. Tushnet, Making
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ways in which we tell each other stories not only in order to live, but
in order to learn how to live good (not well!).
In this Foreword I will explore why we use stories and case studies
(and whether stories and case studies are equal to the task) to
examine ethical and moral issues in the practice of law and provide an
introduction to the interesting tales which will enfold in this
Symposium issue. I conclude with some thoughts about how stories
and cases should be used to teach legal ethics.
There is a feisty debate among literary critics, philosophers and now
legal scholars7 about whether literature (including novels, poetry and
now films and other cultural forms) have any responsibility beyond
the aesthetic-simply to be good on their own terms-or whether
narratives and other cultural forms can be or should be judged in
terms of their moral or didactic messages. For legal scholars and
journalists, this debate expands to the value of "real" as well as
fictional cases and stories in teaching us how to be better or more
moral human beings, as professionals and as "civilians" in the moral
lives we lead. Whether we can tell each other stories not only in order
to live but to exemplify "how" to live morally continues to spark
debates about the use of stories, literature and cases, in law, as
elsewhere.8 Richard Posner, for example, suggests that we are less
likely to be "changed" by literature then to find confirmation of our
true selves in what we choose to read.9
In a tradition which borrows from moral philosophers,10 literary
critics and other professionals who use stories to teach about ethics,"
legal educators have made the argument that stories (and real cases)
enable us to develop empathy12 or sympathetic understanding for
Constitutional Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court 1961-1991 (1997);
Attorney of the Damned: Clarence Darrow in the Courtroom (Arthur Weinberg, ed.
1989); G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self
(1993).
7. Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108
Yale L. J. 1059 (1999).
8. See, e.g., the debates between Richard Posner, supra note 3, Martha
Nussbaum, supra note 4, and Robin West, supra note 3.
9. Posner, supra note 3, at 328. Baron, supra note 7, suggests that we "misuse"
literature when we impose legal or ethical "readings" on a text, which, created for
literary purposes, is not meant to be determinalistically read by lawyers and legal
scholars with insensitivity to the canons of proper literary criticism.
10. Nussbaum, supra note 4.
11. Robert Coles, The Call of Stories, supra note 4; see also Robert Coles, Lives of
Moral Leadership (2000).
12. The term empathy in English is derived from the German "einfuhlung,"
literally translated as "feeling into." See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible
in Lawyering?, 8 Ga. St. L. Rev. 385,389 (1992); see also Lynn N. Henderson, Legality
and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574 (1987); Toni Massaro, Empathy, Legal
Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 Mich. L Rev. 2099
(1989); Robin West, Law and Fancy, 95 Mich. L Rev. 1851 (1997) (book review)
(discussing Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, supra note 4.
2000]
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"others" outside of our own experience. In the words of Robin West,
"[l]iterature helps us understand others. Literature helps us
sympathize with their pain, it helps us share their sorrow and it helps
us celebrate their joy. It makes us more moral. It makes us better
people."13 Like Martha Nussbaum, who argues that telling stories can
enhance the appreciation of others, build a sense of joint community
and add (not substitute) emotional 4 realities to those of rule and
rationally-based judgments, 5 many legal educators now suggest that
the telling of stories is a way to deepen legal and ethical reasoning, by
seeing those caught up in a legal case in a broader, more embedded
situation. Nussbaum (and others) argue that moral dilemmas are
"more vividly rendered in the works of imaginative literature than in
books about ethics, which tend to be pious, predictable, humorless
and dull."' 6
The use of cases and stories are intended to give us a closer, more
intimate, as well as broader experience (even if only vicariously) of
situations-others', so that we might function better in our own. By
bringing vividness and inducing "feelings," stories and cases are meant
to make us feel more directly implicated in what we read and
understand. "Feeling with" a character in a story or case allows us
both to empathize or sympathize, as well as to criticize and consider
what we might do differently in the same situation. Thus, the use of
cases and stories is vicarious clinical experiential learning- thinking
rationally and emotionally from someone else's experience, to make
judgments about what is wise or proper to do in a given situation.
Both literary and real cases offer opportunities to view ethical
decision-making and choices by using the literary devices of
representation, characterization and dramatization and by the
author's or characters' discussions of the ethical or moral decisions
available. Sometimes we are invited to provide our own judgments
and choices by an author (literary or law teacher) of cases or stories,
who gives the story and no more. Other times, we experience a more
didactic treatment by the characters' discussion about what to do.
Additionally, the author may intrude now and then with a "Dear
Reader,"' 7 philosophical disquisition or moral sermon, whether literal
or ironic.'8
13. West, supra note 3, at 263.
14. See Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (1999)
(exploring the relation of a variety of emotions on thinking and decision-making
processes for both groups and individuals).
15. Nussbaum, supra note 4, at xvi-xix.
16. Posner, supra note 3, at 317 (paraphrasing Nussbaum, supra note 4).
17. A device used disarmingly by Jane Austen.
18. See, e.g., Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamozov (1881); Fyodor
Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment; see also, Dershowitz, supra note 5; Scott Turow,
Presumed Innocent (1987), Laws of Our Fathers (1996).
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As many of us have suggested, 9 the use of narrative expands the
sight-lines of reality and imagination for legal and moral reasoning.
Cases and stories allow us to see backward (historically, how this
situation came to be), side-ways (how others in the situation perceive
it) and forward (the consequences and effects of what happened).
Thus, cases and stories give us more information and more choices to
consider than does the primary text of legal education-the
"completed" appellate case. With a range of vision that is panoramic
rather than snap-shotted, readers of (and participants in) stories and
cases increase the possible readings and choices they make. We
consider not only what has happened already but what might happen
and how that future can be the product of our own choices, as well as
external forces beyond our control. Reasoning about and making
choices is what ethical lawyering is all about. So, a study of choice
points more fully elaborated from multiple points of view and varied
points in time necessarily must enhance the development of moral
reasoning skills.
Perhaps the strongest argument for the use of stories (by "literary
lawyers2°") and real cases (by legal clinicians) is the value placed on
contextual knowledge and decision-making. How is this particular
situation constructed? How did it get this way? Who is involved?
What can we do to make the situation better? When lawyers and
students resist mechanistic rule application it is because they think the
situation at hand may be different and that there is something about it
that makes it unique. It is the way in which cases are different, not
alike, that makes intensive case study and storytelling so significant
for those seeking to make good moral and ethical choices. Consider
legal ethical statements and choices like the following:
This criminal defendant was justified in what he did because....
This plaintiff was hurt badly in a manner in which the law should be
called to answer.2'
We have to take this case, despite the seeming conflict of interest
because we know all the parties so well, we can really be a "lawyer for
the situation."'
19. My own arguments for the power of stories to teach empathically about law,
justice and ethics can be found in Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3.
20. Robin L. West, The Literary Lawyer, 27 McGeorge L Rev. 1187 (1996).
James Boyd White has eloquently argued, as one of the primary founders of the law
and literature movement, that all lawyers need to read literature (not just stories
about law and lawyers) because the study of law is a humanity, not a social science,
and thus broadens the lawyer's understanding of human life, as well as legal rule
making. See, e.g., James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (1985).
21. Robin L. West, Caring for Justice (1997) (describing the human hurts and
harms as yet unrecognized by law and legal remedies).
22. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law (ch. 4) (1978)




We must reveal this client's confidential information because if we
don't, x will happen.
Knowing more than "just the facts, ma'am" is what makes legal
issues and cases both interesting and morally challenging. Contextual
information about a case or story tells us about people's motivations,
their relationships with others, and among other things, the place of
their legal "event" in the rest of their lives. "Thick descriptions, ' ' 3 as
such, give us more factors to take into account, more facts, more
information, more emotional and sociological, as well as rule-based,
inputs to consider when we decide what legal action to take. Context
complexifies, but it also makes legal decision-making more human
and realistic. Context allows us to "liberate" ourselves from the legal
rules by fighting them off with grounds for exceptions, departures and
even defiance. 4 Stories provide the moral justification for both rule
compliance and rule challenge. Stories provide the textual
elaboration of the exercise of discretion' and "legal sensitivity."
Contextual reasoning, through the revived attention to casuistry26 as a
form of moral logic, teaches us to be more ethical and moral by
forging the general and the particular in our thinking and in our
actions. 27
There are those who fear or question the use of stories or case
studies in legal process. There is the inevitable tension between
stories and rules, narratives and principles (raised eloquently in this
23. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (1973); Clifford Geertz, Local
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (1983) (see especially Ch. 8,
Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective).
24. Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1988) (describing how
organized resistance to legal rules can change the experience and content of the
rules).
25. Many legal ethicists have urged the development of discretionary approaches
to professional responsibility and legal ethical decision-making, see, e.g., William H.
Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics (1998); William H.
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083 (1988); David B.
Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal
Ethics in Everyday Practice and Trouble Cases (Austin Sarat, ed. 1998); David B.
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers? 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1992); David B.
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 468 (1990), while others urge a
rule-based approach to legal ethical issues, see, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard and William
Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (2d. ed. 1990). For an eloquent elaboration of how actual decision-making
oscillates painfully between rule and discretion, see Vanessa Merton, What Do You
Do When You Meet a "Walking Violation of the Sixth Amendment" if You're Trying
to Put that Lawyer's Client in Jail?, Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 997.
26. See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 489
(1999); Paul R. Tremblay, The Role of Casuistry in Legal Ethics: A Tentative Inquiry,
1 Clinical L. Rev. 493 (1994).
27. As difficult as that may be, see William Carlos Williams, doctor and writer on
medical ethics: "There's a big difference between our high talk, though, and how we
behave ourselves when we're out there on our own..." Coles, The Call of Stories,
supra note 4, at 108.
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issue by Vanessa Merton). 2 When does a specific situation trump a
well worn and fundamental principle or rule of law? What is the
purpose of rules and principles if they can always be argued against by
the power of particularities? How can we insure justice, which is
based on treating like cases alike, if we treat every case or story as sui
generis? The tensions between uniformity and generality on the one
hand, and particularity and context, on the other, are inevitable in any
exploration of individual cases and stories in a legal (and professional
responsibility) world comprised of rules and commands.'
Others are concerned about whose stories or cases are told and with
whose voices. The entry of critical race and feminist narratives-, into
the legal canon was an explicit intervention in the control of legal
discourse. Those claiming to be "outside" conventional legal
discourse have dramatically and effectively changed the terms of legal
discourse by telling their own stories, often from the perspective of
the "acted upon,"31 as well as the actors within the legal system.
Many of the articles in this Symposium raise these issues both
implicitly and explicitly-who tells the stories of legal ethical
dilemmas-the deciding lawyers or teachers? The acted-upon clients?
The empowered or disempowered student?- While most of the
stories discussed in these pages are told by lawyers, legal scholars and
legal clinicians (many individual authors fit in all three categories) we
might ask what the elaborated stories of legal decision-making would
28. Merton, supra note 25.
29. See discussion in Bellow and Minow, supra note 6, Introduction, of the three
complex themes at issue in stories about law practice and legal decision-making: the
role of context and particularity making understanding of institutions and situated
action knowable only to those familiar with the context, the indeterminancy and
incompleteness of most rules and other "constraints" on action which both opens up
and paralyzes would-be legal actors, and the construction, alteration and negotiation
of personal and professional identities as clients, legal workers and others interact
with each other, dynamically, to work on or "solve" legal problems. Bellow and
Minow, supra note 6, at 3.
30. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L Rev. 971 (1991);
Beyond Portia: Women, Law, and Literature in the United States (Jacqueline St. Joan
& Annette Bennington McElhiney, eds. 1997).
31. See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (1991);
Mar Matsuda, Where Is Your Body?: and Other Essays on Race, Gender, and the
Law (1996); Patricia Williams, On Being the Object of Property, in Alchemy of Race
and Rights, supra note 3; Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987); Binny Miller, Give Them
Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 Mich. L Rev. 485
(1994); Lucie White, Subordination. Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
32. Several of the authors, including distinguished legal clinicians Mark Spiegel
and Vanessa Merton assume full responsibility in their pieces for decisions made with
participating students in legal clinical settings in which students are primarily
responsible for their choices and actions.
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look like if written by clients, students and family members of those
involved in legal work.33
Finally, there is the on-going debate about the validation of
stories,' with the question of who decides whether a story is
true/accurate/representative? Is the story valid on its own terms for
teaching or some other reason? Must stories be empirically validated
or verified? Are individual stories as valid as aggregated ones? What
is the difference between a "narrative" story and empirical stories
(anecdotes, made-up stories, "advocacy" (as in "a case made for...")
and data)? Susan Shapiro, in this Symposium,35 represents the skilled
sociologist who can do both-tell compelling individual and
"representative" tales, as well as report on the aggregated stories of
the systematically studied. 6
Who decides which stories we teach from? The debate between the
aesthetic and didactic critics of literature suggests that there are as
many immoral or amoral stories out there as edifying, purifying and
inspiring ones, and so, how do we decide which story or case is most
"useful" for teaching about ethics or morality? Does the ethical
dilemma illuminated in a story make the reader a better decision-
maker if a good decision is made and ethical rectitude is modeled or
33. How does an ethical choice by a lawyer affect that lawyer's family, from the
decision to be so competent a lawyer that one overworks the law and never comes
home. see Posner, supra note 3, at 315, or the "unethical behaviors" of lawyers who
are then imprisoned and away from their families, see Lisa Lerman, Blue Chip
Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics
205 (1999)?
34. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Lies Like Truth? Narrative Legal Scholarship in
Posner, supra note 3; Daniel Farber & Susanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason: The
Radical Assault on Truth in American Law (1997); Daniel Farber & Susanna Sherry,
Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807
(1993); Mark V. Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 Geo. L. J.
251 (1992).
35. Susan P. Shapiro, Everests of the Mundane: Conflict of Interest in Real-World
Legal Practice, Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 1139.
36. For other empirical accounts of law practice, see, e.g., John Hagan & Fiona
Kay, Gender in Practice: A Study of Lawyers' Lives (1995); Terence Halliday,
Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises and Professional Empowerment (1987);
Joel Handler & Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights(1978); Rand Jack & Dana Jack, Moral Vision and Professional Decisions: The
Changing Values of Women and Men Lawyers (1989); Jack Katz, Poor People's
Lawyers in Transition (1984); Donald Landon, Country Lawyers: The Impact of
Context on Professional Practice (1990); Robert Nelson, Partners with Power: The
Social Transformation of the Large Law Firm (1988); Michael Powell, From Patrician
to Professional Elite: The Transformation of the New York City Bar Association(1988); Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients: Power
and Meaning in the Legal Process (1995); Seron, supra note 6; Eve Spangler, Lawyers
for Hire: Salaried Professionals at Work (1986); Robert Stover, Making It and
Breaking It: The Fate of Public Interest Commitment During Law School (1989). For
a strange genre mixture of empirical study and fictionalized narrative, see Michael J.
Kelly, Lives of Lawyers: Journeys in the Organizations of Practice (1994).
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does the reader learn better from a bad moral decision in which the
consequences of pain and grief are vividly amplified? 31
H.
The use of stories, cases and narratives to teach legal ethics
proceeds from several assumptions: that we can accept the "truth" of
the story as told by the storyteller or narrator (author, teacher,
student, lawyer, client); that we can gather enough information from
the storyteller to understand the context from which we must decide
or evaluate a decision made; that we understand enough about the
content of and share enough agreement about the "standards" which
we apply to evaluate these stories (from an ethical perspective); that
one story or case will teach us something not only about that case or
story, but something more useful or generalizable for future cases; and
finally, that we learn something more or different from using stories
or examples to understand ethical issues than the study of abstract
rules and standards or simple readings of ethics opinions and decided
cases. These assumptions inform the stories and cases told and
described in this Symposium, and while each assumption and each
story or case told may be questioned by any reader,' together they
provide a rich set of illustrative examples of what we can learn about
legal ethics from stories and cases. After briefly summarizing what is
significant about each essay in this Symposium, I will suggest some
general issues, concerns and future agendas to consider in the use of
stories or cases to teach legal ethics.
As you read each report, narrative or description of a case or story
in this issue, implicating some issue of legal ethics, consider whether
the story or case does the following:
1. Confirm what you already thought was the "right" rule/action in
the described situation.
2. Alter your view of what the "right" resolution of a particular
ethical dilemma might be. (Changing it completely, complexifying
what you think the legal issues or relevant factors might be, suggesting
alternatives you didn't even think about).
3. Suggest an inadequacy (ambiguity, lack of clarity, contradictory
conflict) in the current rules or principles you thought applied to the
situation.
4. Illuminate some difficulty with, or new approach to, some similar
situation with which you are confronted.
37. This question is not only for legal ethics. Thirty years of debates in clinical
legal education and probably thousands of years of debates in moral education
generally have posed the question of whether good or bad models are better for
teaching. Do we learn better from mistakes or from positive models of behavior?
38. For an excellent review of the philosophical literature criticizing the use of
"examples" for moral reasoning, see Heidi Feldman, Beyond the Model Rules: The
Place of Examples in Legal Ethics, 12 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 409,417-19 (1999).
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5. Suggest some additional information that you might want to have
to evaluate the situation or consider an action taken.
6. Cause you to question/reframe/reinterpret some general ethical
principle, standard, rule or practice which claims to govern legal
ethical behavior.
These questions (and others like them you might prefer) allow us to
interrogate the stories and cases we read or hear about for what we
learn from them-what insights, knowledge, epiphanies, awareness do
we gain from a particular story that helps us to understand more
generally the moral boundaries of ethical law practice and justice. Do
these stories help us to "think" "feel" and "act" more ethically with
respect to clients, students, other lawyers, judges and other actors in
the legal system?
I introduce the essays in this Symposium in five categories of
storytelling or case studies. I begin with the stories and cases which,
for me, are the most powerful explicators and illustrators of the
tensions between ethical principles and ethical actions-the real, on-
going case, in which ethical decisions must be made in the moment by
lawyers, student-lawyers and their supervisors. These stories are told
here primarily by legal ethicists who are also legal clinicians -Vanessa
Merton, Stephen Ellmann and Mark Spiegel.
A second group of authors bridges the narrative span between
reality and fiction, offering up examples, illustrations and concerns
about the "fictionalization" of real cases to illuminate ethical
dilemmas and perhaps widening the scope of what might be available
from the overly contextualized "real" case. I include in this group the
articles by Bruce Green, Lawrence Fox and David Orentlicher (the
latter involving a discussion of a real, but already decided, case and
therefore, "completed" story).
In the third category are legal ethicists who explicitly use fiction (in
one case, legal fiction, Richard Painter on The Comfort Letter and in
the other, Robert Cochran's treatment of Joseph Conrad's Nostromo
as analogical ethical teachings) to explore the dimensions of lawyers'
choices, both at the micro-level of a particular choice in legal practice
and to explore the more macro-ethical concerns of how to "live a
good life"39 as a lawyer and as a human being.
In the fourth category, legal educators Eleanor Myers and Edward
Ohlbaum explore how the "enactment" of ethical dilemmas in
fictionalized but experiential exercises allows students to "act" within
cases and stories to recognize and make ethical choices, thus uniting
ethical deliberation and action in the "practice" of cases and stories.
Finally, both Susan Shapiro and Elizabeth Chambliss, trained as
sociologists, ask us to look at the macro stories of legal ethics, both
temporal and organizational determinants of legal ethics practices.
39. See Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, supra note 4.
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Taken together, the many levels on which stories about legal ethics
can be told offer us a wide lens through which to look at legal ethics
practices and, as I will conclude, provide us with exciting
opportunities to use our own imaginations to broaden and expand the
scope of how we teach legal ethics, ranging from the real cases of
clinics,' the in-depth and contextually based study of real cases,"
fictionalized versions of real cases, to fictional stories of legal ethics,
whether from literature or popular culture,4 2 constructed case-studies,
role-plays43 and films,44 as well as data-based studies of lawyers.45
Beginning with the strength and power of "real" cases in process,
several of the authors here (principally as legal clinicians, practicing
and supervising students on on-going cases) are able to describe,
analyze and illuminate the ethical deliberative process. Vanessa
Merton,' Stephen Ellmann47 and Mark Spiegel explore ethical
dilemmas provided in their own (and students') representation of
clients in the moment where ethical choices have to be made and
actions must be chosen.
Vanessa Merton's story of the dilemma she faced as a legal ethicist
and prosecutor who thought she had a clear ethical duty to report or
otherwise deal with the incompetence of opposing counsel and yet
couldn't, presents one of the most compelling stories in modem legal
ethics. If, as Professor Merton poses the question, an ethics teacher
and scholar cannot "follow the rules," what is the purpose of the rules
of professional responsibility? As she so eloquently puts it "hard
cases make bad lawyers" when in the crucible of deciding what to do
in the middle of a case, Professor Merton could not report or take
action against an incompetent defense lawyer who served up his
client's confession to domestic violence in a case in which her
prosecuting students initially had some doubts about the quality of
their case.49 Professor Merton eloquently describes both her skillful
40. See, e.g., James Moliterno, Professional Preparedness; A Comparative Study of
Law Graduates' Perceived Readiness for Professional Ethics Issues, 58 Law &
Contemp. Problems 259 (1995).
41. See, e.g., Lisa Lerman, supra note 33.
42. Steven H. Goldberg, Bringing The Practice to the Classroom: An Approach to
the Professionalism Problem, 50 J. Legal Educ. (June 2000).
43. See Murray Schwartz & Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lawyers and the Legal
Profession (Supp. 1991).
44. Videotape: Stephen Gillers, Adventures and Further Adventures in Legal
Ethics (NYU Productions 1992- 1994).
45. See, e.g., Susan Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties (forthcoming).
46. Merton, supra note 25.
47. Truth and Consequences, Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 895. This "article" is
actually a book chapter from a larger work, Legal Interviewing and Counseling by
Stephen Ellmann, Robert Dinerstein, Isabelle Gunning and Ann Shalleck (to be
published by West Publishing Co. in 2002).
48. The Story of Mr. G.: Reflections upon the Questionably Competent Client,
Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 1179.
49. Merton, supra note 25, at 1011. Professor Merton's dilemma is all the more
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exegesis of the applicable rules," her committed deliberation in the
exercise of "ethical discretion,"51 and the personal and political angst
with which she eventually decides not to follow her intellectual and
political principles to see that a poorly represented defendant gets
adequate counsel. I don't want to spoil the rest of the story-it is the
telling of the troubling details and the quality of the writing that
makes Professor Merton's article as "can't put it down" good as the
last good mysteries I have read,52 but it is the compelling quality of the
tale and its telling that is likely to make real, to lawyers and students
who read it, the nature of real-world ethical decision making. Most
importantly for the readers of this Symposium, Professor Merton does
more than brilliantly describe her own reasoning and decision-making.
She explores the difficulty of casuistry, lately in vogue in legal ethical
circles, to question whether overly contextualized and particularized
decision-making is particularly likely to get us to defend the particular
choices we make in their "thick" contexts and thus, to escape from the
commands of important, and more abstract, general rules.5 3 Professor
Merton thus interestingly and surprisingly can be read to be making
an argument for an "explicit, codified directive"' that would have
made her duty clearer than the "wiggle room" for situational and
adversarial ethics that a "textured, nuanced and casuistric" approach
to ethical decision-making allowed her. In the context of exploring
her own (and her students') dilemmas in confronting what obligation,
if any, they had to an incompetently represented opposing client (who
was causing real and serious harm to their own client), Professor
Merton illustrates the many layers of pins on which ethical angels may
dance. Failing a clear edict or directive from the rules, prosecutors
must consider whether they have special duties to do justice (Rule 3.8)
and, failing clear guidance within that specialized role, must further
painful and difficult because, in addition to her roles as legal ethics teacher and
supervising clinician, she has a life-time commitment "to the other side" as a former
defense counsel, and because she has been a professional ethicist in the leading ethics
think-tank in the country, The Hastings Institute, and she has also been a bar
disciplinary prosecutor.
50. Such rules as Rules 1.1. (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication),
3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel); 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of
Prosecutor), 4.2 (Communication with Persons Represented by Counsel), 8.3
(Reporting Professional Misconduct) and 8.4 (Misconduct) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.
51. See Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, supra note 25.
52. Sarah Caudwell's legal mysteries, if you must know. See Thus Was Adonis
Murdered (1981); The Shortest Way to Hades (1984); The Sirens Sang of Murder
(1989) and The Sibyl in Her Grave (2000). Sarah Caudwell, like Vanessa Merton, was
(she died recently) a practicing barrister and solicitor while she wrote.
53. This concern about the use of specific examples, cases and stories to escape
from more important general principles is precisely what causes some moral
philosophers to criticize the use of stories. See, e.g., Onora O'Neill, The Power of
Example (1986) discussed in Feldman, supra note 38, at 417-21.
54. Merton supra note 25, at 1004.
[Vol. 69
TELLING STORIES IN SCHOOL
confront the question of what behavior is justified by the larger
adversary system in which the choices to act are located. 5 Thus,
Professor Merton's elaboration of her own ethical dilemma travels up
and down the levels of experience (her students' clinical and novice
experience, mediated by her own supervisory issues and the weight of
clinical practice and scholarship), 56 rule deconstruction and
interpretation, systemic loyalties and justifications (duty to client and
prosecutorial role, as well as larger "justice" concerns) and finally, to
the important moral philosophical questions of substance and method
of whether clear rules and standards might better produce ethical
"compliance" than the nuanced case-by-case deliberation so many of
us are arguing for. In the best of literary and narrative traditions, the
Merton story is like a good O'Henry story with a surprising twist at
the end-after all the well-told "thick description" and suspenseful
narration of the specifics of a single case, we may just hunger for that
"large brooding omnipresent general rule in the sky." At least for
newer lawyers, Professor Merton tells us, case-by-case deliberative
ethical reasoning may only work well with seasoned experienced
lawyers who fully understand from experience the context from which
they are reasoning and acting. Case-by-case deliberation and arguing
from particularities may not provide adequate ethical guidance when
one does not have enough particularities from which to reason
casuistically.
Like Professor Merton, Professor Mark Spiegel is troubled when he
and his students also seem to make choices about advising and making
decisions on behalf of a possibly "incompetent" client" that might go
beyond the rules. In representing a "possibly" incompetent client
with a public housing problem, Professor Spiegel and his students also
confront the interstices of the directives of the rules. First, they have
no clear guidance on how to determine if their client is, in fact,
"incompetent" under the meaning of Model Rule 1.14. What if their
client is sometimes, but not always, incompetent (depending on
whether he takes his medication, is emotionally distraught, is
manipulating his lawyers, is temporarily angry, is "irrational" with
respect to some issues but not others)? To the extent that the text of
the rule allowed the lawyers to use their own discretion about making
decisions or seeking a guardian, how were they to exercise that
discretion and make those judgments? The rule itself, argues
Professor Spiegel, provided little guidance on these important issues
55. See, eg., Monroe Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (1975);
David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse in The Good Lawyer Lawyers' Roles
and Lawyers' Ethics (David Luban, ed. 1983).
56. See eg., Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and
Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 109 (1993-94); James Stark et. al.,
Directiveness in Clinical Supervision, 3 B.U. Pub. Int. L. J. 35 (1993).
57. See Model Rules Prof'l Conduct, Rule 1.14.
2000]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
(along with the many law review articles which have spilled ink on this
topic). 58 Professor Spiegel suggests that, as with many other concepts
in the Model Rules, "incompetence" (of a client) may be a matter of
degree, not subject to the kinds of codified edicts that Professor
Merton might prefer (at least in some contexts). Professor Spiegel's
client was clearly capable of making some decisions-he just seemed
unable (or unwilling?) to recognize the gravity of his housing problem
(that he might lose the apartment he wanted to remain in if he didn't
accept alternative housing offered to him). Does this make the client
in this case any different from many clearly competent clients who
simply don't want to apprehend their "reality" if that requires them to
make painful choices or do unpleasant things? Like Professor
Merton, Professor Spiegel is about to be hoisted on his own petard-
as a scholar of informed consent in legal decision-making,59 Professor
Spiegel has argued for allowing clients to make their own decisions,
after being well informed by their lawyers. When his client seemed
not to be adequately "processing" the legal information provided to
him in textbook-directed counseling sessions, Professor Spiegel and
his students want to talk about the requirements and limits of
"legitimate persuasion" to convince the client to do what they think is
in his best interests.' Unlike Professor Merton, they conclude that
general rules may not help them and when, as in the case of the
"questionably" competent client, the legal issue is one of degree,
stories, variations and context may be necessary to determine what
should be done.
Professor Spiegel's story illustrates the difficulty of applying rules to
gradualist, intermediate and continuum-based concepts where
abstract rules will not work. Like Professor Merton, however,
Professor Spiegel tells his story not just to ruminate about "lawyers
like Mark Spiegel," but to question what the relationship between
stories and rule-making in legal ethics ought to be. Can rules take
account of intermediate, uncertain or indeterminate "facts" when
suggesting what ethical precepts might apply? Does the cumulation of
stories of difficulty of rule application suggest that rules need to be
revised? How is lawyer ethical discretion to be exercised? 61
Like his clinical colleagues, Professor Stephen Ellmann also uses
the story of a real case (an immigration asylum case) to challenge
conventional wisdom, not only about the ethical rules of lawyer-client
privilege and confidentiality, but the now canon-like "rules" about
58. See Spiegel, supra note, at 1191.
59. See, e.g., Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decision Making: Informed
Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 41 (1979).
60. Spiegel, supra note 48, at 1196.
61. See also William Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs Jones's
Case, 50 Md. L. Rev. 213 (1991); Mark Spiegel, The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited:
Paternalism and Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 307.
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appropriate lawyer etiquette in lawyer-client interviewing. Like
Professors Spiegel and Merton, Professor Ellmann can illustrate with
an almost perfect "playback" of a lawyer-client transcript (reported in
alternative formulations to demonstrate the choice points that a
lawyer taking action has) exactly what transpires between lawyers and
clients (in ways we almost never have access to in the reports of
decided cases or other sources for legal ethics teachings). Professor
Ellmann seeks to demonstrate the "consequences" for both lawyer
and client of adhering to rigid, canonical and sometimes wrongheaded
notions of what it means to promise a client confidentiality, while at
the same time assiduously pursuing "all the facts" as suggested by
today's leading legal interviewing and counseling texts. 2 By analyzing
and rigorously deconstructing actual transcripts of real and
hypothesized dialogues between lawyers and clients, Professor
Ellmann explores and challenges some of the leading ethical questions
facing lawyers in everyday practice: Is getting the truth always the
right objective in interviewing? Having elicited the truth, what
obligations or discretion do lawyers have to disclose it over a client's
objection? What advice should clients be given about the scope of
confidentiality in light of the complexities and uncertainty about a
lawyer's duty to disclose some information (what I and others call the
"client interview Miranda" problem)? What advice can lawyers give
clients about the law governing their situations without compromising
the lawyer's obligations to the truth (otherwise known as the
"Anatomy of a Murder"6 problem)? How can lawyers develop trust
and respect from their clients while trying to ferret out potentially
damaging facts, some of which might have to be disclosed in some
limited circumstances? How far should lawyers go in pressing their
clients for the truth? All of these questions, and many others, which
are addressed in Professor Ellmann's article, are explored through the
use of transcripts of lawyer-client interviews to demonstrate vividly
the "consequences" of the truthful answers sought. Unlike more
abstract discussions of lawyer-client privilege or confidentiality, these
illustrative interactions prevent "what if's" or hypothesized escapes
from the "consequences" of learning, for example, that an asylum
applicant has been engaged in unlawful activities that are likely to
disqualify him from achieving asylum status.' Should the lawyer have
stopped several questions earlier to prevent knowledge of this "bad"
fact from coming to light? The implications of choices made cannot
be avoided in the decision-tree like iterations of dialogues
62. See, eg., David Binder, Paul Bergman and Susan Price, Lawyers as
Counselors: a Client Centered Approach (1991).
63. See Robert Traver, Anatomy of A Murder (1958) in which a client is
"coached" on the elements of the defense of "insanity" before reporting on the facts
of his "state of mind" at the time of the murder.
64. Ellmann, supra note 47.
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demonstrated. The elaboration of such "real" or fictionalized lawyer-
client interactions provides the actuality from which students and
lawyers can actually "see" the consequences of particular word
choices -there is no escape from the real story.
Supplementing his own stories with those told in such realistic
works of fiction as Anatomy of a Murder and Presumed Innocent,
Professor Ellmann demonstrates that word choices and questions
asked and answered in lawyer-client interviews can have real
consequences for the client's case and life. By exploring these stories
and "opening them out" as modem films of theater pieces open up the
action of the stage to the "off-stage" antecedents and consequential
actions of the players, Professor Ellmann can question the accepted
wisdom of such old saws as "I need to know all of the facts," in light of
such legal rules as Nix v. Whiteside65 and Rule 3.3, which may require
lawyers who "know" the facts to disclose them, with adverse
consequences for their clients.
Professor Ellmann is able to explore the important issues,
considered every day by criminal and civil lawyers alike, of how much
lawyers should know and when they should know it, given conflicting
loyalties to clients, the legal system and the public, divisions of
responsibilities that remain unclear even in the aftermath of the
approval of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.66 As a
legal clinician, experienced in the stories of cases, both real and
reported, Professor Ellmann can frame solutions, suggest appropriate
questions and help students develop nuanced ethical understandings,
while learning legal skills at the same time. He offers alternative
formulations of questions and approaches in light of considered
explication of the consequences of knowing certain kinds of
information, while at the same time making clear his own views about
the proper lines of lawyers' obligations to truth telling, as well as
lawyers' obligations to client loyalty and respect. This nuanced and
concrete approach to the difficult questions of lawyer-client
interactions about facts and truth, like Professor Merton's,
demonstrates the strength of the clinical case method. While
discussing and remaining sensitive to the Model Rules and scholarly
commentary on the operation of rules and the application of ethical
principles, Professor Ellmann is able to situate those concerns in the
actual contexts in which they will come up-in this case, the almost
always hidden-from-view lawyer-client interview setting. To explore
the ramifications of such ethical rules or principles in their actual
applications, stories will have to be told and interactions will have to
be recorded, in real and "fictionalized" transcripts. By "showing" us
65. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
66. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Third (2000).
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the dialogues of lawyers and clients through stories and enactments,
we can see how ethical choices are operationalized in practice.
Lawrence Fox has long understood the power of the story to teach
legal ethics. In a series of "fictionalized"'67 stories demonstrating
ethical dilemmas of modern legal practice,"' Mr. Fox, a senior partner
and litigator in a major Philadelphia law firm and former member of
the ABA Ethics Committee, has made learning legal ethics as easy as
reading a good short story. Here his story, I'm Just an Associate... at
a New York Firm69 marries the modern day dilemma of the young
upwardly mobile associate who is eager to please and do as he is told
to the real and actual story of partner concealment of evidence in the
Kodak anti-trust case (which led to the conviction and eventual
disbarment of some prominent New York lawyers, as well as the
ruined reputation of at least one nationally known legal hero, John
Doar). ° The story, rather than the reported case, allows us to exist
inside the subjective minds and hearts of at least some of the
characters (author's point of view, of course, limits our access to all
the relevant actors). Thus, we are provided with not just the legal
context, but the familial and in this case, the religious (Catholic)
influences on our ethical deliberators. Mr. Fox sets his story in the
early 1960s to use the form of fiction to give us a quick history and
sociology lesson (pace Chambliss) about the exclusions of the legal
profession. Paul, the young associate, about to be faced with a serious
ethical dilemma of whether to report the activities of a partner in
concealing evidence, is the first Catholic the prestigious Wall Street
law firm, Stuyvesant & Main, has hired. Like his literary mentor,
Louis Auchincloss, Mr. Fox knows that the story can telescope a
number of issues at the same time-social and familial background of
the players, law firm history, case facts, legal education and practice
and ethical dilemmas are easily dramatized, and when well done can
motivate the law student (or lawyer!) reader to want to understand
what the actual rules really are. (This story implicates the rules of
proper ethical supervision of lawyers, Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 5.1 and 5.2, duties to report lawyer misconduct, 8.3 and 8.4,
candor to the tribunal, 3.3, not to mention a variety of substantive
67. As a former practicing lawyer in the city of Philadelphia, I have to say some of
these stories are pretty thinly disguised. Knowledgeable readers of these stories will
recognize the law firms, the lawyers, the judges and the underlying events in many of
them. These stories, then, have all the excitement of the roman a clef to those in the
know. See also, the mysteries of lawyer-author Lisa Scottoline, which also take place
in Philadelphia and those of Scott Turow, whose characters are similarly familiar to
those conversant in the legal mores of Chicago.
68. Fox, Legal Tender, supra note 3.
69. Fox, Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 939.
70. For a fuller description of the actual full Kodak story, see Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); James Stewart, The Partners:
Inside America's Most Powerful Law Firms (1983).
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rules which govern the concealment or destruction of evidence and
procedural rules on the proper scope and exercise of discovery, use of
experts and production of documents). By providing a dramatic and
fully described moment, building in ethical suspense, the reader puts
himself in the shoes of young Paul who wants to make partner, please
his family and ultimately, live with himself, and who has to make some
decisions which will clearly have life altering impacts on him and
others close to him.
In this story, Mr. Fox joins the latest trends in popular culture by
actually including and dramatizing disciplinary proceedings against
some of the principals. (Depictions of ethical issues and disciplinary
charges against lawyers and judges seem to be proliferating in both
popular novels and lawyer TV shows like The Practice and Law and
Order).7 He departs from his usual practice to conclude the story
with a Dear Reader epilogue that includes you, the reader of this
Symposium issue. Two law professors debate the merits of legal
ethics as a scholarly and pedagogic discipline (an issue that is now
pretty well settled, both by ABA accreditation requirements and by
the outpouring of rigorous and interesting scholarship in legal ethics,
viz, this Symposium and many others) and then provides you, the
reader, with a sort of Cliff Notes of an issue spotter on the story. In
case you missed any of the issues, legal or sociological, the law
professors, engaged in conversation, spell it out for you. If I had my
druthers, Mr. Fox would have left this part out. The beauty of his
stories is that they make excellent ethical issue spotters which I would
prefer students and lawyers would have to uncover for themselves.
For like law practice, these ethics short stories situate ethical
dilemmas as they will be found, embedded in the strategic choices
lawyers make about how to handle their cases or how to live their
lives. The greater the ambiguity in the story the better for ethical
learning. For our students and practicing lawyers, ethics issues will
not come in Cliff's Notes or Gilbert's outlines-they will have to be
ferreted out in practices, cases and lives lived. For me, the advantage
of a good fictional story well told is that it forces the reader to "spot"
the issue before he or she can make any decisions about how the
issues should be resolved.
Somewhat troubled by the sort of approach used by Larry Fox,
Professor Bruce Green suggests that by "fictionalizing" actual cases
we may lose important teaching opportunities. In There But for
Fortune: Real-Life vs. Fictional "Case Studies" in Legal Ethics,72
Professor Green compares and contrasts the use of real cases and
fictionalized cases ("parallel case studies") to discuss the relative
71. See Menkel-Meadow, Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers, supra note 6;
Goldberg, supra note 42; see also John Grisham, The Street Lawyer (1998).
72. Green, Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 977.
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merits of different versions of the same "morality tales." He tells us
first the "real" (but incomplete) version of a story of the discharge of
an investment analyst from the brokerage house of Morgan Stanley
who claimed discrimination74 and who was then accused of
falsification of evidence, while Morgan Stanley was accused of
criminal discovery abuses. The real story, Professor Green suggests,
remains a bit of a cipher since we cannot ever truly know the motives
and inner thoughts of the principal actors-the analyst, the brokerage
house partners who made decisions and the various lawyers who
investigated, prosecuted and defended the various lawsuits. Press
treatments may be inaccurate and give students and readers a
distorted view of "what actually happened." Thus, the moral lessons
from the "real case" must remain ambiguous and unknowable.
Professor Green analyses the issues as presented in the press and
relevant legal materials, but many of the legal actions taken and the
ethical rules governing them are uncertain or unclear. Thus, while the
press characterized this case as a "cautionary tale," the reality is far
from known and understood. What moral teachings can we learn
from an incomplete or unknowable story? Professor Green then
presents a fictional version of the Morgan Stanley story, complete
with stated "facts" and motivations (like the stories of Larry Fox and
Louis Auchincloss). 75 The fictional version allows us to see how well-
meaning lawyers can get trapped in the avalanche of legal matters and
cascading legal events. It demonstrates how the organization of law
offices can lead to compartmentalization of issues that prevents a
holistic approach to ethical dilemmas. On the other hand, Professor
Green suggests that because these fictionalized tales are not real, they
too will have limited teaching value. "No real lawyer would act that
way," our students will disclaim (as well as the real lawyers who read
their own stories and say "I did not act that way," or "I did not act for
that reason").76
73. See also, Thomas Shaffer, On Teading Legal Ethics W1ith Stories About
Clients, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 421 (1998).
74. Several "fictionalized" versions of this story have appeared on the TV lawyer
shows as well, including an episode of Law & Order. See Law & Order Trade This
(NBC television broadcast, Mar. 1, 2000); see also Dan Ackman, LAffair Curry Ends
in Settlement, Forbes.com, available at Nvww.forbes.com/2000I09/151mu7.html.
75. Whether lawyers actually can write good fiction or other literary forms
remains a somewhat controversial question. Compare Robert Ferguson, Law and
Letters, supra note 3, who suggests that early American lawyers were of necessity and
inclination, literary men, with Thane Rosenbaum, The Writer's Story, and the
Lawyer's, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20,2000 (book review), at 27, who recently suggested that
lawyers are hindered by their narrow legal training and perspective from being able to
take the broader view and do the more "elegant" writing that great literature
requires.
76. Lisa Lerman, has, however, successfully managed to convince some convicted
lawyers, including Webster Hubbell, to come to her classes to describe exactly how
they got into the trouble they did. See Lerman, supra note 33.
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Perhaps for that reason Professor David Orentlicher prefers to
return to the most conventional forms of legal storytelling- analysis
of the implications of an actual reported case. In his article, Fee
Payments to Criminal Defense Lawyers from Third Parties; Revisiting
United States v. Hodge and Zweig,77 Professor Orentlicher discusses
the impact of a case which held that lawyers may not hide behind the
lawyer-client privilege when prosecutors seek to discover whether
their fees are being paid by a third party (such as a criminal gang) who
is implicated in criminal activity, and which thus invokes the crime-
fraud exception to the lawyer-client privilege rule. While this essay
does not really suggest anything new about the use of case studies or
stories in legal ethics teaching and thus, simply reinforces the
continued importance of conventional legal scholarship in the ethics
field, it at least suggests that when we analyze conventionally reported
or criticized cases it is important to understand both the context and
the effects of such decisions. By reviewing the impact on criminal
defense lawyers of the rule enunciated in this case, Professor
Orentlicher suggests that criminal defense lawyers may be hampered
in whom they may take fees from, and what they may ask about the
sources of their fees. Like Professor Ellmann's interviewers, these
lawyers may have to ask unpleasant questions or they may be
implicated in criminal conspiracy actions themselves. By exploring
the implications of the case beyond its literal holding to drug gang
activities, Professor Orentlicher suggests that third-party fee
arrangements may have broader implications for corporate
representation of individuals. Thus, one story told and decided may
have an important impact on another story yet to be told. (This is,
after all, how the common law system operates-by the cumulation of
story upon story until a cumulation of short stories produces a novella
or novel of "truth" for a general subject area-until a better story
comes along).78
Professors Painter and Cochran prefer the other end of Professor
Green's suggested choices, at least here. As between real and
fictionalized stories about ethics, they see the value of learning from
fiction, both legal and non-legal. Professor Painter's Irrationality and
Cognitive Bias at a Closing in Arthur Solmssen's The Comfort Letter 79
explores the novelistic and fictionalized account of another real case-
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,"0 one of the first cases to
hold lawyers responsible for "aiding and abetting" securities fraud.
The attorneys in the real case allowed a merger to go forward after
they learned information about the misleading earnings figures of the
77. Orentlicher, Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 1083.
78. Consider the continuing debates about who told the "definitive" story of 19th
century Russia-the more religious Tolstoy or the more cynical Dostoyevsky?
79. Painter, Fordham L. Rev, this issue at 1111.
80. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
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subject company which had fraudulently induced stockholder
approval of the merger. In the novel, unlike in real life, the lawyer-
hero instead determines that he cannot issue the "comfort letter," an
opinion letter which is necessary for a large transaction to close.
Professor Painter reports the significant dialogue between lawyer and
client in which the client realizes that his lawyer is not going to be the
loyal professional and simply close the deal, but instead will act from
his own place of moral rectitude and responsibility. The novel ends
dramatically with the deal not closing (in contrast to the actual case)
and nicely opens the way for a legal ethics class to discuss what the
lawyers should have/could have done to learn the relevant
information earlier, spot the ethical issues and determine what legal
advice and actions, if any, might have avoided the problem. The novel
thus provides that rare example of lawyers seeming to do the "right"
thing but only problematizes how lawyers are to recognize the "right"
thing when it is first happening.
Professor Painter uses this wonderful novel1 to examine recent
scholarship on the social, personal and cognitive biases which affect
lawyer-client relations and decision-making,' thus rigorously
marrying legal ethics, fiction and important theoretical and empirical
work that examines how lawyers and clients actually behave.
Professor Painter demonstrates how these biases-risk and loss
aversion, framing effects, over-optimism and over commitment and
agent-principal distortions-can affect how lawyers and clients
interact with each other and produce poor decision-making. By
illustrating, with passages from the novel, how these principles
actually work, Professor Painter makes vivid for students and readers
the operation of complex psychological dynamics which affect legal
transactions but which are often difficult for lawyers and students to
understand in their more abstract forms. Thus, vividness (itself a
possible cognitive bias) through the use of stories and fiction can
illuminate more abstract and complex ideas about the internal
motivations and incentives that lawyers may or may not be aware of
when counseling clients and making their own decisions. I suspect
that any student taught about these cognitive and social biases so
recently incorporated into the legal canon, through the novel The
Comfort Letter, will remember them longer than students taught this
same material from the primary sources of the studies which
document their existence.'
81. I have always thought this novel should be required reading in any corporate
or securities regulation class.
82. See e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literatre Review, 51 Vand. L Rev. 1499
(1998).
83. See Barriers to Conflict Resolution (Kenneth Arrow et. al eds., 1995).
84. This would make an interesting empirical project-to study whether certain
concepts are better remembered through the use of fiction and stories than through
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Professor Cochran uses fiction to explore more "macro" issues of
legal ethics. In Honor as Deficient Aspiration for "The Honorable
Profession": The Lawyer as Nostromo,8 5 he explores the relationship
of honor, money and moral downfall, not through a story about
lawyers, but through Joseph Conrad's tale of money, mining, politics
and corruption in a fictional South American country. Like those who
have recently used Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day,86 a tale
about a butler's loyalty to his employer, analogically applied to
lawyers' duties, Professor Cochran suggests that Nostromo, literally
"our man", loyal and hardworking, but who dies sadly, confessing his
secret life of theft, can be thought of analogically as the modern day
hardworking, loyal, but ultimately, corruptible lawyer. Professor
Cochran explores the novel's treatment of such issues as materialism,
love of money, the ambiguity of politics, loyalty without conviction or
belief, and "the human tendency to destroy creation."'  Using the
novel as a "foil" against which to discuss the meaning of character and
honor in a profession that seems to value material success over all
else, Professor Cochran hopes to have readers and students see, as
through a refracted lens of another "profession," what is most
disagreeable and questionable about their own. As in the uses of The
Remains of the Day' the methodological approach here is to teach
through deflection. The use of fiction, literature and "other
professions" illuminates and puts in relief particular qualities of the
legal profession and particular character flaws or gifts that particular
individuals demonstrate.
Literature is an especially good locus for exploring comparative
professional ethics and many legal ethicists are beginning to turn to a
wider canon of novels and stories about other professionals faced with
ethical dilemmas. Elizabeth Chambliss here 9 opens her discussion of
the importance of studying the historical and sociological organization
of the legal profession by focusing on Mark Twain's classic reportage
(a sort of literary journalism) of his work as a pilot on a riverboat,9° in
which she suggests he offers a "sociological primer on the stages of
professional development." Using Mark Twain's story of the
professionalization of the riverboat pilot, she reports how, like
lawyers,91 riverboat pilots were able to gain control over the training
either abstract, theoretical or empirical materials.
85. Cochran, Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 859.
86. Supra note 5.
87. Cochran, Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 874.
88. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted
Professionalism of The Remains of the Day, 105 Yale L. J. 177 (1995); David Luban,
Stevens's Professionalism and Ours, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 297 (1996).
89. Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, a Case Study, Fordham L. Rev., this
issue at 817.
90. Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi (1883).
91. See Richard Abel, American Lawyers (1989); Magali Larson, The Rise of
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and licensing of new pilots. Twain laments the loss of more voluntary
associational ties to more rationalized, bureaucratic and exclusionary
practices (which eventually succumbs to the diversion of passenger
traffic to the railroad, itself organized through unions). Twain's story
of the monopolization of riverboat piloting echoes many of the legal
profession's founding stories, the "old boy network," followed by
increased credentialing, schooling, licensing requirements and more
rationalized forms of exclusions. Professionalization, including
education, licensing and professional ethics rules promulgation, has
similar trends and effects in a variety of professional settings and may
illuminate both what is gained and what is lost in such processes.
Like Twain's Life on the Mississippi, several other 19th century
literary works are useful for exploring both professional development
and individual ethics issues. Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet
Letter-2 dramatizes the monopoly of the clergy over the morality of an
entire community, while demonstrating the hypocrisy of professional
morality violated in personal lives. William Dean Howells' little-
studied novel, A Modern Instance,93 explores the early days of
journalistic ethics, both in the tensions between ownership of a
newspaper and control over its content (the journalists' form of the
"hired gun" problem) and individual ethics issues about use and abuse
of sources, "pandering" to a public that seeks the sensational, and
tensions about "objectivity" and "neutrality" in authored and
anonymously written stories, as well as conflicts of interests.'
Elizabeth Chambliss suggests that like these "stories" of
professional development, whether fictionalized, fiction or
journalistic, another "story" of legal professionalism can and should
be told to students through the use of sociological approaches to the
subject. She suggests that students should be exposed to the "master
narratives" which explain how the profession was formed, organized,
is regulated and whom it excluded and why, as necessary background
information for understanding anything meaningful about the origins
of particular ethics rules or precepts. Chambliss suggests that law
students and lawyers should understand that their own "creation
myth" often obscures the issues of conflict and power within the
master narrative of monopolization of technical knowledge. By
teaching the story of the history of the profession, the modem legal
ethics teacher can conclude with one of our most recent and contested
Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (1979).
92. Hawthorne, supra note 5.
93. Howells, supra note 5.
94. This novel, which is more noted for its treatment of divorce in late 19th
century America, suggests some very interesting analogies to legal ethics and legal
profession development. (See, eg., editorials, like lobbying, as a form of interest
advocacy, whether tied to paying "clients" or owners, writing or representation that




stories - multi-disciplinary practice95 -to explore how the profession
continues to seek to prevent competition from others, both lay and
professional.
Like Elizabeth Chambliss, Susan Shapiro believes that legal
scholars and teachers look for cases and stories in the wrong places-
at the top of the mountain (whether in Supreme Court cases or ethics
rules systems) rather than in the valleys or "base camps" where the
real action is. Thus, she points to empirical work, both quantitative
data analysis and in-depth qualitative interviewing of the lawyers who
actually interpret and live with legal ethics rules in their day to day
practices. Like Elizabeth Chambliss, Susan Shapiro, a sociologist,
suggests that the "real" stories of legal ethics may be located in social
structure and organization, as well as in individual action. In a brief
report here of a masterful book-length study of the practices of Illinois
lawyers in conflicts of interest situations, Dr. Shapiro redefines the
meaning of a "case" or "story" by describing how lawyers actually
understand what a "conflict of interest" is in their daily practices and
how they navigate and negotiate around the meanings of rules and the
demands of practice. She is able to tell the "real" stories that lawyers
have told her (anonymously, but characterized by size of practice and
location in the state) about how they understand the roles and rules of
legal ethics. In what is likely to become a classic study of the
empirical reality of conflicts of interest, Dr. Shapiro reports the
lawyers' understandings of what conflicts are (technical rule
definitions; financial, interest or positional conflicts) and how they are
"managed" in both large and small firm settings. She is able to
explore how organizational factors affect choices about conflicts of
interest (size of firms, availability of replacement clients, finances,
conflicts among laterally moving lawyers, "ethnically" based practices,
small town reliance on the wise professional to be the "lawyer for the
situation") thus providing a much richer (and far more interesting)
story of how conflicts actually operate than the reported cases I have
been teaching for twenty years are able to convey. For Dr. Shapiro's
subjects (practicing lawyers in Illinois) the law seems strangely absent.
Conflict of interest rules are widely regarded as anachronistic, 96
scholarship on the subject is not useful and bar committees' advice
and ethics rulings are also regarded as providing inadequate guidance.
Lawyers facing conflicts of interest issues simply "muddle through,"
making decisions as best they can. In Dr. Shapiro's words these
lawyers seem to hunger for a broader form of education, one that will
teach them, not just case reading and analysis, but more fact intensive
95. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a
New Rule? 72 Temple L. Rev. 869 (1999); Symposium, Future of The Profession: A
Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 Minn. L. Rev. (2000).
96. Shapiro, supra note 45.
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instruction on contextual and social organizational decision-making
and judgment,9 as it occurs in the real world.
The sociological vision allows us to look at legal professionalism
issues from without-as others might see us. So, as literary treatments
of lawyers allow us inside to examine individual subjectivities,
intentions and motivations, Chambliss' and Shapiro's work allows us
to see the legal profession issues from a "bird's eye view," 91 widening
students' appreciation (or depreciation) of the profession they are
about to enter.
Eleanor Myers and Edward Ohlbaum demonstrate that realistic
stories, presented through case role-plays and experiential exercises
can make real for students all the levels of analysis they must confront
when making choices as legal actors. In Discrediting the Truthfidl
Witness: Demonstrating the Reality of Adversary Advocacy," they
dramatize one of "the three hardest questions""'0 in criminal
advocacy-can a lawyer cross-examine and discredit a truthful witness
(here in the ethically charged case of a criminal rape case)? Through
the use of enacted dramatizations of direct and cross-examinations of
the complaining witness and closing arguments to a jury, Professors
Myers and Ohlbaum ask students to enact and consider what limits
exist or should exist to protect a truthful witness, should the nature of
a crime (context) affect the rules and choices made, how should both
defense lawyers and prosecutors exercise what discretion they have
from system-differentiated role obligations and what does advocacy or
partisanship suggest about the obligations of counsel to clients, the
truth, the system and the jury? After students have read relevant
rules and skills materials they are placed in actual roles and by
enacting choices must deal with skill, ethics and sociological and legal
role tensions in what they choose to do. Discussion of what is
appropriate when the students themselves have watched or
participated in a demonstration makes real the many context-specific
and general choices that lawyers in such situations face. What rule, if
any, applies? What loyalty to client justifies departures from any
97. On the importance of teaching problem-solving, decision-making and
judgment in legal education, see, for example, Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 Temp. L Rev. 811 (1999); Paul Brest & Linda
Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 Wash. L Rev. 527 (1994); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Teaching Legal Creativity and Problem Solving Possible in
Legal Education? 6 Harv. Neg. L. Rev. (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer
as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in
Lawyering, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 785 (1999).
98. Actually, my favorite image of seeing the world from above to gain greater
knowledge about boundaries etc., is Merlin's magical transformation of the young
Arthur into a bird so he might see the stupidity of human boundaries over the natural.
See, e.g., T.H. White, The Sword in the Stone (1939).
99. Myers & Ohlbaum, Fordham L. Rev., this issue at 1055.
100. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966).
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particular set of rules?" 1 How ought the adversary system operate?
What is the goal of adversary justice? Truth? Protection of individual
liberty and fairness? Professors Myers and Ohlbaum report that class
discussions of both micro-behavioral ethics choices and the larger
system and political issues implicated in this famous ethics dilemma
are far richer with a live, demonstrated "case" or "story" than more
traditional readings of cases, rules and legal scholarship on the
subject.
III.
In my view, like Joan Didion's, in order to decide how to live and
how to live good, we need stories. Stories tell us how others before us
have resolved similar issues. Some stories exemplify the good
characters we aspire to,1° others merely reveal the difficult situations
we may be placed in (whether to cross-examine a truthful witness,
whether to do something about an incompetent counsel on the other
side, whether to report on a client's wrongdoing) so we can anticipate
them in less than real and harmful situations. Reading stories allows
us to try on our own resolution of difficult problems as we examine
with hindsight, foresight and peripheral vision what happens in books
to other people. Stories dramatize real human need, pain and
difficulties so we can empathize with others like ourselves-clients,
victims, others affected by legal actions, judges, the lawyers on the
other side-and hopefully, expand our sympathetic range of judgment
and action. Stories can make vivid what is otherwise dull and hard to
learn.
From the moment I began teaching legal ethics, just about twenty
years ago, I began with "stories ripped from the headlines"1 3 by
writing role-plays, based on real cases,1°4 to place students in the
actual role of having to make a legal ethics choice in a simulated
situation (so that no real consequences would flow therefrom and
possibly hurt a client, but in which a student would feel and
experience what making a choice of behavior was like). My students
have been prosecutors, divorce lawyers, class action lawyers, legal aid
lawyers, public defenders, corporate lawyers, labor union lawyers,
clients, disciplinary board members, paralegals, associates, partners,
cabinet officers, public officials, candidates for public offices or
judgeships, judges, political radicals and conservatives, truth tellers
101. This implicates the continuing controversy of the duty of the defense counsel
with respect to allowing a client to commit perjury. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157
(1986); Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics (1990).
102. For so many criminal defense lawyers the canonical inspirational texts are
Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird (1960) and Clarence Darrow's biographies, see
supra note 6.
103. Law & Order (NBC television broadcast) (current advertising tag line).
104. See Schwartz & Menkel-Meadow, supra note 43.
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and truth exaggerators. They have negotiated, counseled, examined
witnesses, tried and decided cases, presided over office meetings,
testified to committees and administrative agencies, lobbied and made
decisions about who gets hired, fired and who gets legal services.
Placing students in these roles has made vivid and real the learning
(beyond even the Problem Method so popular in the leading ethics
casebooks)0 s and allowed us to explore simultaneously the legal ethics
issues of rule application, philosophical and moral principles and
discourse and the sociological organization of law practice.
Stories and role enactments allow multiple levels of analysis to be
explored at the same time and with the different points of view of
those in role (the acting "lawyers" or "clients") and those outside of
role who watch, analyze, criticize and contribute to the ethical
dialogue which follows each role enactment in my classes.
Increasingly, I also turn to literature and journalism to explore the
antecedents and consequences of legal actions taken and to broaden
the context of information that these stories provide.
More and more, as this Symposium demonstrates, the "real"
reported cases can be read and contrasted to fictionalized accounts
(Morgan Stanley, National Student Marketing, A Civil Action, etc.) in
other media so students can compare and contrast alternative actions
and choices.
I am a totally committed and converted legal ethics storyteller, as
are most of the authors in this Symposium, and, I suspect, most of its
readers. Yet, we must also consider the stories or lessons that these
stories tell us. Vanessa Merton counsels us to examine the dangers in
casuistry and case-by-case deliberation. If our contexts are so rich and
our advocacy so good that we can justify almost anything in every sti
generis case, then what is the purpose of rules, moral principles and
generalizable aspirations for us all? If real cases present the difficulty
of applying rules, as the work of Professors Spiegel, Ellmann and Dr.
Shapiro suggest, what should we do about rule drafting, amendment,
and enforcement? If fictional stories do not seem real to our students,
as Professor Green suggests, what will our students take away from
our fictionalized stories, great literature or creative role-plays? Does
truth in role-playing or literature matter? And, how should we
evaluate the "truth" function of the legal ethics stories we tell? I find
the latter question particularly troubling as the television shows
depicting lawyers increasingly dramatize legal ethics issues. I love the
coverage, but I fear that the overly dramatic and often incorrectly
depicted treatments and "answers" to these questions will actually
give out more bad information and practice than good.
105. See, eg., Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics
(4th ed. 1995); Andrew L. Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility (3d. ed.
1989); Deborah Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics (2d. ed. 1995).
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Do vividly portrayed examples teach too much? Do dramatic
stories ignore the equally difficult but more common everyday legal
ethics problems (conflicts of interest, client trust accounts, billing
practices, competence)?
If we tell stories in order to live (and in order to teach) we must be
aware of their strengths and their weaknesses. Particular stories
should not allow us to skip over general moral principles, while
concern for achieving systemic or generalized "justice" should also not
blind us to particularized mercy and other human values. Stories and
cases, as illustrated by the examples depicted in this Symposium, exist
on a continuum from the real, on-going case, to the decided, reported
and finished real case, from the "fictionalized" story or role-played
simulation of a real case, to the journalistic "documented" version of
the "facts" of the real case, to the totally fictional and artistic or
merely "trendy" popular cultural depiction of legal ethics dilemmas.
If this Symposium tells any story of its own it is that the kinds of
stories we can tell are now enormously rich and various and the
methods of storytelling and case studies we can use are increasingly
diverse and ever more vivid. Since the levels of legal ethical discourse
vary so much we should pay some attention to which forms of
storytelling and what kinds of case studies illuminate best which kinds
of issues we should study. There are issues of individual ethics,
motivations, intentions, deliberations and choices. There are issues of
rule drafting and organizational structure. Most profoundly, there are
deep jurisprudential issues of system design (is the adversary system
still the best we can have?) 1°6 and whether our legal system produces,
in the end, more justice than less. For the storytellers, truth seekers
and ethicists among us these are good times indeed to be teaching
legal ethics, for as our methods and stories proliferate we have more
interesting ways to teach that which it is most important to teach-
how we may lead good lives in this legal profession we have chosen.
106. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-
Modern Multi-cultural World, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 5 (1996).
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